Recent empirical studies find evidence that commodity prices have become more correlated with financial markets since the early 2000s. This increased correlation is called the financialization of commodity markets and is conjectured to be due to the influx of external (portfolio optimizing) traders through commodity index funds, for instance. We build a feedback model to try and capture some of these effects, in which traditional economic demand for a commodity, oil say, is perturbed by the influence of portfolio optimizers. We approach the full problem of utility maximizing with a risky asset whose dynamics are impacted by trading through a sequence of problems that can be reduced to linear PDEs, and we find correlation effects proportional to the long or short positions of the investors, along with a lowering of volatility.
Introduction

Background and motivation
Recent empirical studies, for example [38, 7] , have documented the "financialization" of commodity and energy futures markets due to an influx of external traders through investment vehicles such as commodity index funds or ETFs. They report that price movements of goods such as oil which, prior to the last decade, were mainly governed by supply and demand of users of the commodity, now exhibit much greater correlation with the movements of equity markets.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, increased attention is being paid by politicians and regulators to the consequences of securitizing and trading derivatives on nontraditional investment assets. One result of the active trading of a securitized asset may be a fundamental shift in the economics that drives the price of the underlying. This change could be explained by professional investors beginning to trade actively in commodities for the purposes of portfolio diversification and speculation. At the beginning of the last decade, such trading activity in commodities increased dramatically, for example by hedge funds, and coincided with an increase in their correlation with the stock market. Causation between the change in trading activity and the change in the nature of commodity prices is still a subject of debate, as there are various global economic factors that may have played a role. While a purely mathematical model will not be able to separate out these possible effects, a possible explanation can be offered by analyzing the price impact of portfolio optimizers in a simple and idealized framework.
We build a model in which the demand of utility maximizing traders is introduced into an environment of a fundamentals-driven commodity price. We find the explicit form of the perturbed commodity price in the absence of investor feedback effects, and we develop observations on the changes in volatility, and correlation with stocks, that the demand of the portfolio optimizers creates.
having the power utility. They explicitly analyze the feedback effects on the price process when the relative influence of portfolio optimizers is small, and they analyze the system numerically under more general assumptions. Their main conclusion is that rational trading from solving a Merton portfolio optimization problem is stabilizing, and therefore lowers volatility, in contrast to what was found for option hedging strategies.
In a different but related problem, Christensen et al. [10] employ an equilibrium approach where the asset price is determined endogenously using a market clearing condition. With exponential utility, they solve for each investor's optimal investment strategy and find the equilibrium dynamics.
Models for financialization
The present paper builds a simple feedback model to capture some of the empirical effects documented as the financialization of commodity market. We review several alternative avenues explored in the literature.
Sockin and Xiong [36] build a one-period feedback model for the financialization of commodities emphasizing the consequence of information frictions and production complementarity. They find that an increase in commodity futures prices may drive up producers' commodity demand and thus the spot price. In their model, the futures price is used as a proxy for global economic strength and other producers' production decisions, and in certain circumstances this information effect can dominate the cost effect and result in a positive demand elasticity. Basak and Pavlova [3] explore the effects of financialization in a model that features institutional investors alongside traditional futures markets participants, but they focus on the case where the institutional investors are evaluated relative to a benchmark index.
In a different context, Cont and Wagalath [11] illustrated how feedback effects due to distressed selling of mutual funds lead to endogenous correlations between asset classes. However, price impacts due to distressed selling are exogenously given by a block-shaped order book model and the funds follows a passive buy-and-hold strategy unless the fund value drops below certain threshold. In a static setting, Leclercq and Praz [23] consider an equilibrium based model that emphasizes the role of information aggregation of the commodity futures market. They demonstrate that speculation in futures markets facilitates hedging by suppliers, and hence decreases expected spot prices and increases the correlation between the financial and commodity markets.
Organization
In Section 2 we introduce a feedback model and derive an iterative sequence of problems that increasingly incorporate the feedback effect and capture the impact of financialization. In Section 3 we derive the HJB equation from dynamic programming principle for the stage-k problem and show that the HJB equation can be linearized with a power transformation. In Section 4 we present the numerical solutions to the first couple of stages and quantify the induced correlation between the equity and commodity markets. In Appendix B we return to the feedback model of Nayak and Papanicolaou [28] and present an explicit solution to the first stage in the feedback sequence which greatly facilitates the model analysis. Appendix C provides a tractable but less realistic model with exponential utility, where the full fixed point problem can be reduced to solution of a system of ordinary integro-differential equations. We conclude in Section 6.
Feedback Model with Market Users and Portfolio Optimizers
We build a model leading to the price of a commodity in which there are two main distinct groups creating demand: market users and portfolio optimizers. The price is determined from a supply-demand market clearing condition.
Reference model with market users
Market users trade in the commodity market for direct industrial use or for hedging their operational exposures. We assume their demand for commodity is driven by a stochastic incomes process I t which, roughly speaking, captures economic growth, and can be thought of as determining the amount of capital available to the market users for purchasing the commodity.
For simplicity of exposition and explicit calculations, we will take (I t ) to be a geometric OrnsteinUhlenbeck process described by
where a, b > 0 and W c is a standard Brownian motion. This captures in a simple way periods of geometric growth along with mean-reversion or stochastic cyclicality. Given a commodity price Y t , the demand D(Y t , I t ) from market users is increasing in I t and decreasing in Y t . Again for simplicity and explicitness, we use the isoelastic demand function
where λ > 0. This kind of demand structure in a continuous-time model is used for instance in [14, 32, 28] . We also assume a fixed constant supply A of the commodity available for trading at each time period. That is, we ignore growth or decline of supply over the short-run. In the reference model in which there are only market users (or reference traders), we label the price
showing that the reference commodity price Y (0) dynamics is also a geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, which is the commonly-employed Schwartz [33] one-factor model of mean-reverting commodities prices:
Incorporating portfolio optimizers
The portfolio optimizers, on the other hand, have no direct operational or hedging interest in the commodity, but seek to invest in the commodity market so as to maximize their expected utility at a fixed terminal horizon T. We assume for tractability the constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function with risk aversion γ > 0:
In addition to the commodity market, the portfolio optimizers can invest in the risk-free money-market account with constant interest rate r, and a single representative stock index which follows the geometric Brownian motion
where W s t is a standard Brownian motion independent of W c t . By this choice, we have assumed that the pre-financialized commodity price Y (0) in (2) is independent of the equity market, so later feedback correlation is in comparison to this case.
Denoting by θ t the investment in the commodity market by the portfolio optimizers, the aggregate demand for commodity is given by D(Y t , I t ) +ǫθ t /Y t , whereǫ > 0 parametrizes the relative size of the portfolio optimizers compared to the market users. The market-clearing condition is
which leads to
where ǫ =ǫ/A. This causes the equilibrium price process for Y t to deviate from the geometric OrnsteinUhlenbeck process Y (0) . The portfolio optimizers' position θ t is modeled as coming from an expected utility maximizing criterion. However, unlike in the classical Merton problem, their actions impact the commodity they trade through (6), and we describe the extent of this feedback as related to the degree to which they are aware of their own price influence. Because they impact the commodity price Y and their trades are governed by portfolio diversification concerns, θ t is affected by the stock index price S t and this induces correlation between commodity and equity returns, that is, financialization of the commodity price. The goal is to try and quantify this effect.
In our model we do not get into the details of how commodities are traded, for instance through commodity index funds or ETFs, but instead think of all these investments as linked to futures contracts which are themselves linked to the physical delivery of the commodity which is necessarily finite. The grouping of the traders into two large groups means that each group has a significant price impact due to the finiteness at each time of the supply A available for trading.
Fixed point characterization of problem
We say that a pair ( π * , θ * ), respectively denoting the fractions of wealth invested in the stock and commodity markets, is an equilibrium solution to our utility maximization problem with feedback if the following are satisfied:
1. The stock price S t is given by (5) and the commodity price Y t is determined by the market clearing condition
where X t is the controlled wealth process with strategies ( π * , θ * ) such that
2. The pair ( π * , θ * ) maximizes the expected utility of terminal wealth Z T
under the budget constraint
The set of admissible strategies A will be given explicitly in Section 3.1 when we define the value function and derive the associated HJB equation.
Feedback iteration
We propose a feedback iteration to capture the successive improvement of trading strategies due to the increasing awareness of self-impact by the commodity traders. This approach follows an iterative chain of reasoning which is best illustrated in the simple setting of the famous "guessing 2/3 of the average" game.
Interlude -guessing 2/3 of the average
In this game, a number of players are asked to pick a number between 0 and 100, with the winner of the game being the one that is closest to 2/3 times the average number picked by all players. We can solve this game iteratively as follows:
Stage-0 A typical player ignores the other players and choose a random number between 0 and 100. [27] conducted an experiment in which students were asked to guess what 2/3 of the average of their guesses will be, within limits of 0 and 100. She found that the average guess for the groups was around 35 and very few students chose 0. Moreover, it was observed that many students chose 33 and 22, which are respectively 2/3 of the midpoint 50 and 2/3 of 2/3 of the midpoint. The number of steps of iterated reasoning most students seemed to be doing were between 0 and 3 rounds.
Stage-k portfolio optimization problem
In light of the guessing game, we model the aggregate portfolio optimizers as comprising a large number of commodity traders. Each individual trader is too small to affect the market price, but their aggregate demand does have an impact, which is enforced by the market-clearing constraint. We first analyze the stage-k problem and return to the explicit solution for stage-0 in Section 3.3. 1 In general, the stage-k commodity price process Y (k) for k ≥ 1 no longer follows a geometric OrnsteinUhlenbeck process, as was the case in the reference model k = 0 in (2). We suppose the dynamics of Y (k) can be written as
for some coefficients P (k) , Q (k) , and R (k) . The aggregate wealth process for the bulk of the portfolio optimizers is denoted X t , and they employ the stage
is the dollar amount held in the stock index S at time t, and θ (k−1) is the dollar amount held in the commodity Y (k) at time t. Their self-financing aggregate wealth process X follows
For our inductive hypothesis, we suppose that
and similarly for Q (k) and R (k) , which come from the solution of the stage-(k − 1) problem; and that π 
is a Markov process with respect to the filtration generated by (W c , W s ).
In stage-0 the portfolio optimizers do not trade the commodity so we have that θ (−1) = 0 and Y (0) is given by the reference model (2) from which we see that
and in particular they do not depend on X t . At stage-k, all but one of the commodity traders follow the stage-(k − 1) strategy. We imagine that a single "smart" trader seeks to outperform the others by taking into consideration the price impact of their stage-(k − 1) strategy. We denote his stage-k portfolio by (π (k) , θ (k) ) and the self-financing condition determines the following wealth process Z t for the "smart" trader:
His goal is to maximize expected utility at the terminal time T. This leads to a Merton problem we must solve to determine the stage-k optimal portfolio.
Deriving the stage-(k + 1) dynamics from stage-k strategies
Given the stage-k optimal portfolio π (k) and θ (k) of the "smart" trader, we determine its effect on the stage-(k + 1) commodity price process. As is well known and we will confirm in the next section, because of power utility, the optimal Merton strategies are of the form π
That is to say, they are given as fractions of the current wealth Z t where the fractions are determined by the current levels of X t and Y (k) t . After having solved for the stage-k optimal portfolio, the "smart" trader realizes that the other traders will follow the same reasoning and trade according to the stage-k strategy. The aggregate position on the commodity is then θ (k) (t, X t , Y (k+1) t )X t , and the stage-(k + 1) market clearing constraint reads
We can determine the dynamics of the stage-(k + 1) commodity price process Y (k+1) t by applying Itô's formula to (12) and matching coefficients of the dt, dW c t , and dW s t terms. We can then solve for P (k+1) , Q (k+1) , and R (k+1) in terms of π (k) and θ (k) .
Proposition 1. The dynamics of the stage-(
where
,
andm is given by (3).
Proof. Apply Itô formula to the market clearing constraint (12) and substitute the dynamics of X t using (10) with k replaced by k + 1. Finally substitute I t in terms of X t and Y (k+1) t using (12).
Therefore, given θ (k) and π (k) , we can determine the stage-(k + 1) commodity price dynamics P (k+1) , Q (k+1) , and R (k+1) . Roughly speaking, the coefficient R (k+1) determines the stock-commodity correlation. Notice that the expressions for P, Q, and R are valid only for small ǫ as their denominators may become zero. However, we will see in Section 4 that the solution to the stage-k problem is well-behaved since the underlying price processes never get to the problematic region due to a repulsive potential. We focus here on the isoelastic demand function to illustrate the main features of financialization in a specific setting, but remark that the same techniques can be applied to more general demand functions, provided that they are invertible.
HJB analysis
In this section, we use dynamic programming to derive an HJB PDE that determines the optimal strategies the "smart" trader follows in each stage of the feedback iteration. We show that it can be reduced to a linear PDE and give the explicit solution in stage-0.
Value function and HJB equation
The value function for the "smart" trader in stage-k described in Section 2.5 is defined by
where X t follows (10), Y t follows (9), and Z t follows (11), and we have defined the set of admissible strategies A to contain adapted processes
See for instance [29, chapter 3] . Following the usual Bellman's principle, we obtain the stage-k HJB equation
for t < T and x, y, z > 0. Here we have denoted the trading strategy by ν = (
, and the drift vector and volatility matrix of the pair of tradeable assets (S, Y (k) ) by
Also defined are
as well as
where we identify (x 1 ,
Analysis of the HJB equation
From the point of view of the "smart" trader, he is facing a complete market Merton problem, being able to trade two assets, the commodity and the stock, driven by two Brownian motions W c and W s . Therefore we expect that the HJB equation can be reduced to a linear equation via a Cole-Hopf type transformation. We show that it is indeed the case in the following.
Proposition 2. The value function is given by
where G(t, x) solves the linear PDE problem
with terminal condition G(T, x) = 1, where
The optimal portfolio
Proof.
Optimization Assuming for now that V zz is negative (that is, it inherits the concavity from the terminal condition), the supremum in the HJB equation is given by
The HJB equation can then be written as
where M is defined in (16) .
Separation of variables Making the transformation
with terminal condition g(T, x) = 1, where ζ is defined in (16) .
Cole-Hopf transformation
We make the power transformation g = G δ , previously introduced by Zariphopoulou [40] , and observe that the nonlinear term in (19) becomes
Using the definition of C 1 and C 2 , we note that
so the nonlinear term is
Meanwhile,
so the nonlinear terms cancel provided we choose
With this choice, we obtain the linear PDE for G(t, x) given in (15) . Inserting transformations (14) for V into (18) gives the optimal portfolio (17) in terms of G.
Notice in particular that the optimal holdings in commodity and stock index are proportional to wealth, as we expect for power utility, and we write:
where the functions π (k) (t, x, y) and θ (k) (t, x, y) can be read from the components of ν * in (17).
Remark 1.
In Appendix B we study an application of our feedback model to the equity market where the stage-1 HJB equation can be solved analytically.
Stage-0 PDE and explicit solution
As it turns out, the stage-0 PDE problem has an explicit solution. This is the Merton problem with geometric OU dynamics as studied in [5] and [21] , for instance. From the market-clearing constraint (without any influence of portfolio optimizers), we see that the stage-0 commodity price dynamics (2) is simply a geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. That is, we have P (0) = a(m − log y), Q (0) = λb, and R (0) = 0.
Proposition 3. The stage-0 value function is given by
and
Proof. After separating out the wealth variable z and making the linearizing transformation, the stage-0 equation (15) for G is
with terminal condition G(T, x, y) = 1. Observe that the terminal condition does not depend on x, and that the term rxG x drops out from the PDE if we look for a solution G(t, y) as a function of t and y only.
Intuitively it is clear that the stage-0 value function should not depend on the aggregate wealth of the speculative traders as they have no influence on the commodity price. Next, we make the transformation G(t, y) = H(t, u) where u = log y. This results in
Recall that M is defined by
We have a PDE of the form
with terminal condition H(T, u) = 1, where c 0 through c 4 are constants given in Appendix A. As shown there, the solution is of the form
where f 0 , f 1 , and f 2 satisfies a system of ordinary differential equations, whose solutions lead to (20) .
The optimal portfolio can be recovered from the value function using (17):
We observe that the investment in the stock π (0) follows the fixed-mix strategy as in the Merton problem [26] . The fraction of wealth θ (0) invested in the commodity, however, depends on both the remaining time to the investment horizon T − t and the commodity price Y t .
Remark 2. The verification argument for candidate solutions of the HJB equation is classical and a rigorous treatment follows closely Benth and Karlsen [5, Section 4] and Zariphopoulou [40, Theorem 3.2].
Numerical Results
For stage-1 and onwards, we have to resort to numerical methods to solve the PDE problems. As an illustration, we consider the following set of parameter values detailed in Table 1 . 
Solution via finite difference
The stage-k PDE (15) can be written in expanded form (where we suppress the k superscripts)
G.
After using the log transformation u = log x and v = log y, we may write the discretized equation as
In the scheme, the first subscript denotes the u coordinate in the uniform (u, v)-grid, while the second corresponds to the v coordinate. The superscript represents the time step. We note that we are solving a terminal value problem: we start with G N i,j = 1 for all i, j and step backward in time using (25) which is the explicit Euler scheme. Table 1 .
Truncation of domain
Boundary conditions
In the limit x → 0, the price impact of portfolio optimizers vanishes because they have no capital to invest, and we should recover the stage-0 solution. We therefore use the analytic solution (20) for the stage-0 problem to impose a Dirichlet boundary condition at x = 0 (or equivalently u → −∞).
As for the other three boundaries, we derive approximate boundary conditions by the PDE itself, which are discretized by one-sided finite differences without requiring any additional information concerning the behavior of the solution for large x and for large/small y.
Notice that in (13), the denominators in the definitions of P, Q, and R can be zero for y sufficiently small or x sufficiently large. Therefore our model can breakdown when the commodity price is sufficiently low and the portfolio optimizers take over a sufficiently large share of market. However, we check that the truncation of domain does not result in significant error by solving the linear PDE (15) using Monte-Carlo simulations. In all instances we have tested, the difference between the PDE solutions and the MonteCarlo estimates are within the Monte-Carlo standard error. See Figure 1 for instance where we compare the Monte-Carlo estimates with the numerical PDE solutions to (15).
Stage-0 benchmark
Since we have an explicit solution to the stage-0 problem, it serves as a benchmark for testing our numerical scheme.
In Figure 2b we plot the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the commodity market, computed using (17) by differentiating the numerical solution to the linear equation (15) . Also shown is the optimal portfolio θ (0) from formula (24) . Notice that the two curves are almost indistinguishable, and we check that the numerical solution has relative error less than 1.5% throughout the domain of interest. This validates the use of the numerical scheme in the following sections.
Stage-1 numerical solution
We now solve the stage-1 HJB equation numerically. The commodity price dynamics P (1) , Q (1) , and R (1) can be computed from the analytic solution to the stage-0 problem. Indeed, using that the stage-0 optimal portfolio (24) does not depend on x, equation (13) can be simplified considerably:
Using the explicit finite difference scheme (25), we can solve for the value function G. The optimal portfolio (π (1) , θ (1) ) is then recovered from (17), see Figure 3 for the result. We observe that the stock holding π (1) now varies with the level of the commodity price y, where in the pre-financialization stage-0, it was independent.
Volatility and correlation
Ultimately we are interested in studying how price impact effects the volatility of the commodity price and its correlation with the stock price. To this end, we note that the stage-k volatility η (k) of the commodity price and the stage-k correlation ρ (k) with the stock price are given by
In Figures 4a and 4b , we plot the stage-0, stage-1, and stage-2 volatilities and correlations as functions of 
Stage-1
The stage-1 volatility and correlation can be computed explicitly using the explicit solution to the stage-0 problem. From (26), we see that
to leading order in ǫ, where π and θ are the stage-0 optimal portfolio. Notice in particular that the sign of ρ t is given by the sign of θ (0) (t, Y
t ), as long as the Merton ratio π (0) is positive, or equivalently µ > r. Therefore, when the commodity price is low (resp. high), portfolio optimizers are long (resp. short) the commodity and feedback correlation is positive (resp. negative).
Stage-2
From the (numerical) solution to the stage-1 portfolio optimization problem, we can determine the stage-2 commodity price dynamics using (13) . This gives the stage-2 volatility of the commodity price as well as it correlation with the stock. We notice that the volatility of the commodity price reduces further in stage-2 (compared to stage-1) when the commodity is near its long-term mean; while the stage-2 correlation is greater when the commodity price is below its mean level, and approximately the same as in stage-1 when above.
Comparative Statics
We observe how ρ (1) 
t ) varies in the other model parameters, by modifying each of γ, ǫ, a, and b independently while holding the other parameters constant, see Figure 5 . Since the instantaneous correlation depends on the commodity price Y (1) t , we consider a fixed low commodity price (50% of its mean, in blue) and a fixed high commodity price (150% of its mean, in red).
As we observed analytically earlier in this section, we see that when the commodity price is below (resp. above) its mean and the portfolio optimizers long (resp. short) the commodity, the correlation is positive (resp. negative). As the risk aversion γ increases, the correlation induced by the perturbation of the risk-averse portfolio optimizers tends to zero. A sufficiently risk-averse trader will invest in neither the stock nor the commodity and thus will have no market impact. We also see that increasing ǫ increases the magnitude of the induced correlation. If the aggregate wealth of the portfolio optimizers is large enough, they overtake the market and the model breaks down. Interestingly, increasing the speed of mean-reversion a also increases the magnitude of the induced correlation. In the extreme case with a very large a, the portfolio optimizers will be able to achieve large and reliable gains in either a short or long position in the commodity whenever it deviates from its mean, and they choose a highly leveraged position in the commodity and it caused a high induced correlation.
Simulation
We can compute the empirical volatility and correlation arising from our feedback model. See Figures  6 and 7 for the daily sampled volatility and correlation over a 2-year horizon using 5,000 paths in two scenarios: low commodity volatility (b = 0.3) and high commodity volatility (b = 1). We see that financialization causes a decrease in commodity volatility in both scenarios. This is expected because the portfolio optimizers are buying low and selling high, and their trading has a stabilizing effect on the commodity price. Moreover, we see that the stage-0 correlation is sharply peaked at zero; while at stage-1, a relatively low (resp. high) commodity volatility b can induce a mostly negative (resp. positive) correlation between the commodity and stock.
Empirical Analysis
Cross-correlations Between Commodities
We gathered daily prices of ten of the most heavily-traded commodity futures prices (see Table 2 ) over the period from 1990-2011.
In line with the hypotheses of Tang and Xiong [38] , we choose 2004 as the dividing time-point between the unperturbed commodity price movement and the perturbed price movement due to the influx of index investors.
We find that the correlation between each commodity and the S&P 500 in the "non-indexed period" (1990-2004) is, averaging over the ten commodities, -0.0078435. In the "indexed period" (2004-2011), the average commodity-to-stock correlation is 0.1883. This dramatic increase supports the idea that commodities became more correlated with stocks after 2004. In comparing all possible pairs of cross-correlations between these commodities, we find that the average value of the correlation over all commodity pairs is 0.05988 in the non-indexed period and 0.1860 in the indexed period, which supports the idea of increased commodity cross-correlation as discussed in [38] .
Parameter Estimation
For each of the ten commodities, using the historical data, we can estimate the parameters of the stage-0 price process through the use of maximum likelihood estimation. The continuous form of the price process is, by (2) ,
By the non-closed-form approach detailed by Franco [13] , we show, in Table 2 , the maximum likelihood estimators for the parameters of this geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for each commodity, where a 1990 denotes the best-fit value for the parameter a over the period beginning at 1990, and so on. We notice that most commodities experience a reduction in their best-fit value of a from the nonindexed period to the indexed period, though it increases for the two energy commodities. For each commodity, the best-fit value of the long-term mean log-price m increases, though not inconsistent with what would be expected due to inflation between the two periods. There is no clear trend in the best-fit values of b for the commodities over the two time periods. Table 3 shows the correlations between the commodities and the S&P 500. This illustrates the significant increase in correlation between commodities and stocks that we have tried to model. 
Correlations In Extreme Price Cases
Application: model calibration
As an application of the proposed model, we perform a calibration exercise to demonstrate that our model can generate the size of empirical correlation typically observed in the commodity market as shown in Table 3 . The pre-financialized commodity dynamics is taken to be the Schwartz one-factor model (2); using oil as an example, we take the market calibrated parameters found by Schwartz [33, Table 4 ] and estimate the size of portfolio optimizers in our model (using ǫX as a proxy) to generate realistic correlation observed in the commodity market. Figure 8a shows the empirical correlation between the stage-1 commodity price and the stock price, for different values of ǫX. Using 1000 Monte-Carlo simulations, we show the average empirical correlation as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles. We see that with realistic market parameters, our model can generate the typical correlation level with the size of portfolio optimizers ǫX of order one. For instance, for ǫX = 5, a time series analysis of two-year daily data could reveal a correlation between 0.2% at the 25-percentile and 30% at the 75-percentile. Figure 8b shows the corresponding distribution of empirical correlation for ǫX = 5.
Conclusion
Despite the speculative nature of the portfolio optimizers in this model, they will frequently act to stabilize commodity prices through their trading. As in the simple economic argument of Friedman [15] , the portfolio optimizers generally buy the commodity when the commodity price is below its mean and sell the commodity when the commodity price is above its mean, creating a demand effect which keeps the price nearer to its mean. We have shown that this volatility reduction occurs when the amount invested is somewhat near an unleveraged long position.
Correlation between commodities and the stock market is also of significant practical interest, and we have shown that the sign of the stage-1 induced correlation in our model will be the same as the sign 
of the fraction of wealth invested. This leads to a high positive correlation when the commodity price is unusually low, which is undesirable, but it also leads to a high negative correlation when the price is unusually high, which is desirable for investors as it will, in some sense, cause the commodity price to move in the opposite direction as the overall economy during the times when the commodity price is high. Overall, through numerical simulations, for a few different batches of reasonable market parameters, the net effect of the introduction of the portfolio optimizers seems to be a reduction in commodity price volatility and an increase in correlation with the stock market.
A Solution to stage-0 PDE
The stage-0 equation (22) is
with terminal condition H(T, u) = 1, where c 0 through c 4 are given by
Substituting the ansatz (23) into the above yields
This yields three ordinary differential equations we have to solve to determine H:
C.1 Stage-1 dynamics
We motivate the fixed-point characterization of the full feedback problem with the stage-0 optimal investment problem and the induced stage-1 dynamics. As in Section 2, there is a single representative stock index with dynamics (5). The portfolio optimizer allocates his wealth into investments in the stock and the commodity. The wealth process X t follows
The value function for the exponential investor is the maximum expected terminal utility
The usual dynamic programming principle leads to the HJB equation
with terminal condition v(T, x, y) = −e −γx .
Proposition 5. The solution to the HJB equation (35) with terminal condition v(T, x, y)
= −e −γx is given by
Proof. This follows easily by substituting the ansatz (36) 
and solving ODEs for the functions A(t), B(t), C(t).
The optimal investment in the commodity can be written in feedback form
In particular, the number of shares θ/y demanded by the portfolio optimizer is affine in the stage-1 commodity price Y (1) t . The modified market clearing condition reads
We therefore obtain
It follows that the stage-1 commodity dynamics is given by
In particular, the commodity price Y t is still independent of the stock price S t . Intuitively, portfolio optimizers with exponential utility do not induce financialization since their trading in the commodity markets is not affected by the wealth generated in the financial markets.
C.2 Full Feedback Fixed Point Problem
We now consider the fixed-point characterization of the full problem, where the price impact of the portfolio optimizers is fully incorporated in their trading decision, as described in Section 2.3. Motivated by the fact that the stage-1 commodity dynamics (37) is again an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, we postulate that the equilibrium commodity price with feedback described there will also be a time- The market clearing condition (7) 
r(T−t) a(t)m(t) b(t) 2 + C(t) 1 + ǫγe −r(T−t) a(t)+r b(t) 2 − 2B(t)
, F 1 (t) = 1
+ ǫγe −r(T−t) a(t)+r b(t) 2 − 2B(t)
.
Solving the ODEs for B and C leads to proposition.
Clearly the lack of induced correlation is due to the well-known limitations of exponential utility, whose tractability in many problems is undermined by paradoxical conclusions.
Finally, one can view the above proposition as the limit of the stage-k problem under exponential utility. Following the steps outlined in Section C.1, we can derive the stage-(k + 1) dynamics
with b 0 (t) ≡ b, a 0 (t) ≡ a, m 0 (t) ≡m, and 
While the convergence properties of the family (a k , b k , m k ) to (a, b, m) in Proposition 6 seems to be rather involved, we note that (by removing the k in (41) and (42)) the limit necessarily satisfies (39) . So, if the feedback iteration scheme converges, it does so to the full feedback equilibrium.
